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PLAUSIBILITY BEYOND THE COMPLAINT 
JOSEPH A. SEINER*
ABSTRACT
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court announced a new plausibility standard for a plain-
tiff ’s allegations. The decisions may have even broader implications,
however, as many federal district courts have already applied this
pleading standard to a defendant’s affirmative defenses. This Article
makes sense of Twombly and Iqbal in the context of the affirmative
defense. 
This Article addresses the two possible readings of Twombly and
Iqbal: first, that the decisions are limited to a plaintiff’s civil
complaint, and second, that a defendant must also comply with the
Supreme Court’s plausibility standard by pleading enough facts to
sufficiently state an affirmative defense. This Article explains why a
close textual review of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, combined
with numerous policy and practical considerations, support the
broader second reading of the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
What it actually means to plausibly plead an affirmative defense
is a much more complicated question. This Article closely examines
this issue through the lens of one of the most complex and important
defenses in all civil case law—the affirmative defense to a claim of
sexual harassment. By way of this example, this Article explains how
the plausibility standard would apply more broadly to defendants in
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all civil cases. The question whether the plausibility standard should
apply to defendants—and if so, how it should apply—is likely to
create significant controversy in the coming years. This Article
establishes a foundation for that discussion.
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 “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.”1
INTRODUCTION
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal3 herald a
new pleading standard not only for plaintiffs but perhaps for defen-
dants as well. In these recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court
announced a new standard for evaluating a plaintiff ’s allega-
tions—that is, a complaint now must set forth enough facts to give
rise to a plausible claim to relief. The Court left unanswered,
however, whether this plausibility standard should also apply to a
defendant’s affirmative defenses. This Article makes sense of
Twombly and Iqbal in the context of a defendant’s responsive
pleadings. 
Simply put, there are two possible readings of Twombly and Iqbal
for the affirmative defense.4 The first reading concludes that these
decisions apply only to a plaintiff ’s complaint and should not be
extended to a defendant’s pleadings.5 Supporters of this complaint-
only approach point to the fact that the recent Supreme Court
decisions make no reference to a defendant’s pleadings and are
easily distinguishable on this basis.6 Additionally, whereas plaintiffs
typically have many months or years to investigate and file their
claims, defendants must respond to a federal complaint within
twenty-one days.7 As a result, it is a fair reading of Twombly and
Iqbal—as well as a sensible application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—to conclude that the plausibility standard should not be
extended beyond the complaint. 
This Article explains why this reading should fail in favor of a
second approach—applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard more
broadly to all civil pleadings. This approach would require a defen-
1. ROBERT A. PALMATIER, A DICTIONARY OF ANIMAL METAPHORS 332 (1995).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4. See infra Part II (analyzing the different approaches to Twombly and Iqbal for the
affirmative defense).
5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the complaint-only approach to recent Supreme Court
pleading decisions).
6. See, e.g., McLemore v. Regions Bank, No. 3:08-cv-0021, 2010 WL 1010092, at *12-13
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010).
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a) (setting forth the time limit to respond to a complaint).
2012] PLAUSIBILITY BEYOND THE COMPLAINT 991
dant to plead enough facts to give rise to a plausible affirmative
defense.8 This all-pleadings interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
decisions is well supported by a close textual review of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.9 Beyond this textual reading, however, a
number of policy considerations support the all-pleadings approach.
Indeed, the basic reasoning that led the Court to develop the
plausibility standard for allegations in a complaint applies equally
to the affirmative defense.10 In particular, the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions expressed significant concern over the costs of implausible
litigation on defendants.11 These costs run both ways, and a friv-
olous affirmative defense could prove quite expensive for plaintiffs
to debunk, because they would be forced to test the merits of the
defendant’s implausible claim in discovery.12
In announcing the plausibility standard the Court also raised
issues of basic fairness to defendants.13 According to the Court, it is
unfair to provide a defendant with insufficient notice of a claim and
to simply assert pure legal conclusions in the complaint.14 These
fairness concerns apply equally to plaintiffs, who should similarly
be entitled to notice of the basic facts related to any affirmative
defense. Fairness in pleading should be symmetric, and both parties
should be held to the same principles. Indeed, in the past, the courts
have treated the motion to dismiss a complaint and the motion to
strike an affirmative defense under an identical standard.15 We
should therefore not create a new asymmetry in pleading standards
following the recent Supreme Court decisions.
Practical considerations further support applying the plausibility
standard to affirmative defenses. A plaintiff that is provided with
basic factual information about a defense can more fully investigate
and research the defendant’s claim. This will result in more stream-
8. See infra Part II.B (discussing the all-pleadings approach to Twombly and Iqbal for
affirmative defenses).
9. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
11. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 100-11.
13. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 1953; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 558-59.
14. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 1953; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
15. See, e.g., Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905 (N.D. Ill.
2006).
992 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:987
lined discovery, as the plaintiff will more narrowly tailor discovery
requests to the specifics of the particular defense.16 The short time
frame defendants have to respond to a complaint and assert their
defenses should typically not be problematic, as defendants will
often possess all of the information necessary to support their de-
fenses.17 And when additional facts are uncovered during discovery,
the courts should liberally allow defendants to amend their
pleadings.18 Finally, as demonstrated in this Article, satisfying the
plausibility standard will typically be an easy endeavor for defen-
dants.19 A simple sentence or short paragraph will often suffice,
though there may be some instances in which defendants have more
difficulty proceeding under this standard.
Textual, policy, and practical considerations all support applying
the plausibility standard to a defendant’s responsive pleading. In
practice, however, what plausibly pleading an affirmative defense
actually means is a much more difficult question. This Article
attempts to bring clarity to this issue by way of example and ex-
amines the contours of one specific affirmative defense—an em-
ployer’s defense to a hostile work environment claim.20 This Article
examines this particular defense as employment discrimination
cases—and civil rights claims more broadly—have been one of the
areas most affected by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.21 Given the
difficulty plaintiffs have faced in the courts in satisfying the
plausibility standard for workplace claims, it stands to reason that
a defendant could confront similar problems when articulating an
affirmative defense in this same context. This Article thus explores
what the plausibility requirement for defendants would look like in
one of the most critical and complex areas of employment discrimi-
nation law. By examining one important defense, this Article
16. See infra text accompanying note 104.
17. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (setting forth the rule on amending pleadings).
19. See infra Parts II.B, III (discussing the all-pleadings approach to affirmative defenses
and providing an example in the sexual harassment context).
20. See infra Part III (applying the plausibility analysis of Twombly and Iqbal to an
employer’s affirmative defense in hostile work environment case).
21. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty the
employment discrimination and civil rights plaintiffs have faced in attempting to satisfy the
plausibility standard).
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explains how the plausibility standard would apply more broadly to
affirmative defenses in all civil cases. 
In Part I, this Article sets forth the relevant provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and briefly summarizes the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions, which established the plausibility
standard. In Part II, this Article explores the two possible readings
of these recent Supreme Court decisions for affirmative defenses
—the complaint-only reading and the all-pleadings approach. This
Part offers a textual analysis of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and considers the policy and practical considerations of each
of the possible readings. It concludes by explaining why the all-
pleadings analysis is the better of the two approaches, particularly
from the standpoint of equity and fairness to the parties.
In Part III, this Article examines what the all-pleadings approach
to affirmative defenses would look like in the context of an em-
ployer’s affirmative defense to a claim of sexual harassment. This
Part explores the contours of plausibly pleading that defense and
provides a concrete illustration of the facts a defendant must allege
to satisfy the new standard articulated by the Court. Through this
example, this Part explains what defendants in all civil cases must
plead to comply with Twombly and Iqbal. In Part IV, this Article
concludes by exploring some of the implications of adopting the
plausibility standard for affirmative defenses and closely examines
some of the benefits and drawbacks of this approach.
I. TWOMBLY, IQBAL & THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly set forth what must
be alleged in a plaintiff ’s complaint or in a defendant’s answer. The
Twombly and Iqbal decisions both interpret Rule 8(a), which re-
quires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”22 As discussed
in this Part, the recent Supreme Court pleading decisions have
interpreted this language as requiring that a plaintiff sufficiently
state a plausible claim to relief.23 Similarly, Rule 8(b) provides the
22. FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
23. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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requirements for the answer, making clear that the defendant must
“state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted
against it.”24 Rule 8(c) addresses the requirements for any affirma-
tive defenses, requiring that the defendant “affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense” when “responding to a pleading.”25
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal when a
complaint is insufficient and fails “to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.”26 Similarly, pursuant to Rule 12(f), “any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” can be stricken from
a responsive pleading.27 A court may act sua sponte in striking this
material or upon the motion of one of the parties.28 As explained in
greater detail below, the lower courts frequently treated a motion to
dismiss and a motion to strike under the same standards prior to
Twombly and Iqbal.29
Though the Federal Rules seem fairly clear on their face, in
practice they have been difficult to apply. Twombly and Iqbal have
only added to this confusion, undoing decades of federal pleading
precedent and leaving countless unanswered questions for litigants
attempting to navigate the Federal Rules. The facts of Twombly and
Iqbal have been well visited—and revisited—by scholars and the
judiciary. For purposes of providing context to the affirmative
defense debate, however, this Article briefly summarizes these de-
cisions here. 
In Conley v. Gibson—a 1957 civil rights case—the Supreme Court
concluded that it is an “accepted rule” that a plaintiff ’s allegations
should not be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”30 This “no set
of facts” language governed federal pleading for the next fifty years,
until Twombly and Iqbal revisited this standard. In Bell Atlantic
24. FED R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1).
25. FED R. CIV. P. 8(c). The time frame for responding to a complaint is relatively short,
as the “defendant must serve an answer ... within 21 days after being served with the
summons and complaint.” FED R. CIV. P. 12(a).
26. FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
27. FED R. CIV. P. 12(f).
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing lower court treatment of
motions to strike and motions to dismiss).
30. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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Corp. v. Twombly, the Court again considered the proper pleading
standard for federal claims, this time in the context of a complex
antitrust case.31 In Twombly, the plaintiffs brought a class action
lawsuit against several large telecommunications companies,
alleging that these defendants had “engaged in certain parallel
conduct unfavorable to competition” and had maintained agree-
ments to “refrain from competing against one another” in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.32 In considering the sufficiency of
the complaint in the case under Rule 8(a)(2), the Court “retire[d]”
the “no set of facts” language from Conley, as this earlier standard
had “been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.”33 
In place of the Conley “no set of facts” standard, the Court
adopted a plausibility requirement.34 Under this requirement, a
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”35 A sufficient allegation must be more than
“speculative,” and plaintiffs must plead enough facts to “nudge[ ]
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”36 In
articulating this plausibility standard, the Court expressed concern
over the high cost of litigation and noted that these costs can
persuade many “defendants to settle even anemic cases” prior to dis-
covery.37 Similarly, the Court expressed concern over basic fairness
to defendants and noted that these litigants are entitled to “fair
notice” of the allegations against them.38 Such fair notice requires
that a complaint include “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”39 In applying the new plausibility standard to the facts of the
case, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint “fail[ed] to
state a valid § 1 claim” and that “antitrust conspiracy was not
31. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
32. Id. at 548-51.
33. Id. at 555, 562-63.
34. Id. at 556-57.
35. Id. at 570. 
36. Id. at 555, 570.
37. Id. at 558-59.
38. Id. at 555.
39. Id.
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suggested by the facts” set forth in the allegations.40 The plaintiffs
thus failed to plausibly state a claim to relief.41
The Court’s adoption of the plausibility requirement in Twombly
made clear that federal pleading practice would be forever changed.
However, one question still remained—whether plausibility
pleading was limited strictly to antitrust claims or whether the
standard would apply more broadly to all civil cases.42 In Iqbal v.
Ashcroft, the Court resolved this question in the context of a civil
rights case brought against former Attorney General John Ashcroft
and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller.43 The
plaintiff, a Muslim and citizen of Pakistan, was arrested after the
events of September 11, 2001.44 He alleged that Ashcroft and
Mueller “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected [him] to
harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or
national origin.”45 In analyzing the plaintiff ’s claims, the Court
determined that the Twombly pleading standard should apply to the
case, as the plausibility standard is applicable to “all civil actions,”
including “antitrust and discrimination suits.”46 The Court thus
made clear that its analysis in Twombly would not be limited to
antitrust suits.47
In Iqbal the Court expounded upon its decision in Twombly and
discussed the two important principles to understand from that
case.48 First, the Court noted that legal conclusions are given little
weight under the plausibility standard and “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.”49 Thus, a plaintiff making only “conclusory
statements” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
40. Id. at 569.
41. Id. at 570. Interestingly, in articulating the new plausibility requirement, the Court
noted that it was not adopting a “‘heightened’ pleading standard.” Id. at 569 n.14.
42. See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact
of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1824
(2008) (“On one end, a number of writers have concluded that Twombly is best understood as
a decision extending only to pleading in antitrust contexts. At the other end, writers believe
that Twombly signals revolutionary overhaul of the entire concept of notice pleading.”).
43. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
44. Id. at 1942. 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1953.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1949.
49. Id. at 1949-50.
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action” will not survive a motion to dismiss.50 Second, the Court
emphasized that under Twombly a plaintiff ’s allegations must rise
to the level of plausibility.51 Evaluating a complaint under that stan-
dard is “a context-specific task” involving a court’s use of “judicial
experience and common sense.”52 The Court noted that the plausibil-
ity requirement does not equate to a showing of “probability” but
demands more than simply showing a “possibility” of success.53 A
complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations” but must
consist of something beyond “an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”54 As with its earlier decision in
Twombly, the Iqbal Court emphasized the issue of fairness in
pleading, as well as the importance of avoiding unnecessary
litigation costs.55
In applying the plausibility standard to the facts of the case, the
Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the Twombly
test.56 Thus, the plaintiff ’s “complaint fails to plead sufficient facts
to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination.”57
Although its holding is significant, the real import of Iqbal is its
application of the Twombly pleading standard beyond the confines
of an antitrust case. And as discussed, Iqbal also provides notewor-
thy guidance on how the lower courts are to apply that pleading
standard in all civil cases.58 One critical issue not presented in
either Supreme Court case, however, is the applicability of the
plausibility standard beyond the complaint. Thus, whether the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions apply to a defendant’s responsive
pleadings remains an open question.
50. Id. at 1949.
51. Id. at 1950.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1949.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1949, 1953. Given the involvement of high-level government officials in the case,
the Court was particularly concerned about the “heavy costs [of litigation] in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed
to the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Id. at 1953.
56. Id. at 1954.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expanded the pleading standard for ‘all civil
actions,’ ... and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”).
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II. PLAUSIBILITY BEYOND THE COMPLAINT
Simply put, there are two possible interpretations of the plaus-
ibility standard for the affirmative defense. The first reading con-
cludes that Twombly and Iqbal are applicable only to a plaintiff ’s
complaint and that these decisions should not be extended to a
defendant’s affirmative defenses. This reading would thus conclude
that the recent Supreme Court decisions are simply inapplicable to
defendants. The second possible reading would require that
defendants—like plaintiffs when drafting a complaint—state
enough facts to give rise to a plausible defense. This Article
examines both possible interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c) and ultimately concludes that basic principles of
equity and fairness require that a defendant provide a plaintiff with
a plausible basis for its affirmative defenses.59
Before undertaking this analysis, it is worth briefly noting that
what “plausible” exactly means under the current case law is
unclear.60 We have only the guidance provided by the Supreme
Court in defining this term, as set forth above.61 From Iqbal and
Twombly, we know that a sufficient allegation must be more than
“speculative,” and a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “nudge[ ]
59. The question of the applicability of the plausibility standard to the affirmative defense
has been raised by both the courts and commentators. See, e.g., Melanie A. Goff & Richard A.
Bales, A ‘Plausible’ Defense: Applying Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 34 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 603 (2011) (discussing the affirmative defense question); Ryan Mize, Comments
and Notes, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal
and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1260-61 (2010) (discussing different views
of lower courts on the affirmative defense question). This Article attempts to enter this debate
by providing an in-depth analysis of this issue and further explaining how the standard would
work in practice. 
60. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 859 (2010) (discussing the “instability” created by Twombly and
Iqbal); Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 655-56 (2011) (“Twombly was
immediately condemned, even by its supporters, as a ‘vague,’ ‘less than pellucid,’ ‘not entirely
consistent,’ even ‘incoherent’ opinion that provided lower courts with virtually no guidance
about the content of federal pleading standards.” (citations omitted)); Joseph A. Seiner, After
Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 228 (2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal have replaced a relaxed
pleading standard with a more complex and undefined plausibility test.”).
61. See supra Part I (providing an overview of the Twombly and Iqbal Supreme Court
decisions).
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their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”62 A
pleading must include “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.”63
Moreover, legal conclusions are given little weight under the
plausibility standard, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of
action’s elements” will not survive a motion to dismiss.64 Plausibility
does not equate to a showing of “probability” but demands more
than simply showing a “possibility” of success.65 
This guidance is helpful, but leaves the parameters of “plausibil-
ity” largely undefined. As we examine the two possible interpreta-
tions of Rule 8(c), then, we should keep in mind that the contours of
the Court’s pleading standard are still being defined in the courts
and academic literature.66
A. The Complaint-Only Reading
Perhaps the narrowest reading of the applicability of the plausi-
bility standard to the affirmative defense is to conclude that
Twombly and Iqbal are case specific and apply only to a plaintiff ’s
complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)—upon which the
Court’s decisions are premised—requires that a complaint include
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”67 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), however,
requires only that the defendant “affirmatively state any avoidance
or affirmative defense” when “responding to a pleading.”68 As the
text of these two requirements differ in important respects, it would
be fair to limit the Twombly and Iqbal holdings to Rule 8(a) and
thus apply the plausibility standard only to a plaintiff ’s complaint. 
This complaint-only approach is bolstered by the differences
between the provisions of the Federal Rules. Rule 8(a) requires not
62. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1951.
63. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
64. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
65. Id. at 1949.
66. It is also worth noting that this Article focuses specifically on the applicability of
Twombly and Iqbal to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) and does not contemplate whether
the plausibility standard applies to other provisions of the Rules.
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
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only that the plaintiff state the claim, but further that the plaintiff
show—through a “short and plain statement”—that it “is entitled to
relief.”69 Under Rule 8(c), however, a defendant need only state its
affirmative defense, and it is not required to further show its
entitlement to this defense.70 One federal district court summarized
these differences, as well as its view on the applicability of the
plausibility standard to the affirmative defense:
Unlike [Rule 8] subsections (a) and (b), subsection (c) does not
include any language requiring the party to state anything in
“short and plain” terms.
....
On its face, Twombly applies only to complaints and to Rule
8(a)(2), because the Court was interpreting that subsection’s
requirement of “‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” ... The opinion
does not mention affirmative defenses or any other subsection of
Rule 8.71
Besides these textual differences in the Federal Rules, there are
also practical reasons to read the Court’s plausibility standard
narrowly. Most notably, plaintiffs typically have many months to
investigate their claims and draft a detailed complaint setting forth
a plausible basis for their entitlement to relief. The only time con-
straint on a civil plaintiff proceeding in federal court will be the
applicable statute of limitations for the particular cause of action.72
There are obvious practical considerations that provide an incentive
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). It is worth noting that the language of Rule 8(c), which originally
required that a defendant “set forth” its affirmative defense, was amended in 2007. The new
version of the rule now requires that the defendant “state” the defense. Compare FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(c) (2006), with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (2010). Although arguments can certainly be made as
to whether setting forth a defense is a greater or lesser burden than stating a defense, the
explanation of the change in the rules suggests that it was simply a stylistic, nonsubstantive
alteration. See COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL
RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 47-48 (2006) (proposing style changes to Rule 8(c)).
71. McLemore v. Regions Bank, No. 3:08-cv-0021, 2010 WL 1010092, at *12-13 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Westbrook v. Paragon
Sys., Inc., No. 07-0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007)
(noting that unlike Rule 8(a), Rule 8(c) does not include “a requirement that the answer ‘show’
the defendant is entitled to prevail on its affirmative defense”).
72. See, e.g., Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. Kan. 2011).
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to bring claims more quickly, such as preserving documents and
testimony. Nonetheless, plaintiffs generally have a fair amount of
time to craft their particular claims prior to filing suit. In respond-
ing to a complaint, however, defendants are much more time con-
strained. Indeed, under Rule 12(a), a party has only twenty-one
days from the date of service to answer the complaint and set forth
its affirmative defenses.73 This significant time limitation on the
defendant may serve as a substantial barrier to fully investigate the
plaintiff ’s allegations and assert enough factual detail to state a
plausible affirmative defense. Depending on the nature of the alle-
gations, three weeks may simply not be enough time for the
defendant to adequately develop its defenses.74
It is also worth considering that defendants that fail to assert an
affirmative defense in the responsive pleading may forever lose that
defense.75 This risk, combined with the short time frame for filing
the response, strongly encourages a defendant to include all possible
affirmative defenses in the answer, even when the defendant has
only limited factual support for those defenses. It also serves as a
sharp contrast to plaintiffs who usually have much more time to
carefully consider which claims to include, or exclude, from the
complaint.
Finally, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions arose specifically in the
context of the sufficiency of a plaintiff ’s complaint, and the cases
were considered under Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6).76 Thus, on its face,
the plausibility standard articulated in these Supreme Court
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a) (setting forth the time limit to respond to a complaint); see
also Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2010) (“There may well be occasions when it would be reasonable to impose stricter
pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significant time to develop factual support for
its claims, as opposed to a defendant who has only twenty-one days to respond to a complaint
and assert any affirmative defenses.”).
74. See, e.g., Tyco Fire Prods. v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); see also Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL
2990159, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Everette, 875 F. Supp. 1181,
1189 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“Generally, when a party fails to raise an affirmative defense in its
answer, it waives the defense.... However, the majority of federal circuit courts have held that
when a defendant raises an affirmative defense in a manner that does not result in unfair
surprise to the other party, noncompliance with Rule 8(c) will not result in waiver of the
affirmative defense.”).
76. See supra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal).
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decisions applies only to an analysis of a plaintiff ’s complaint.77 As
discussed below, the reasoning of the Supreme Court can naturally
be extended to Rule 8(c). Nonetheless, it is clear that the Supreme
Court did not expressly apply the plausibility standard to affirma-
tive defenses.78 In fact, the Court did not mention the affirmative
defense issue at all.79 To apply the plausibility standard to a
responsive pleading, then, would be to extend this standard beyond
the confines of the Court’s decisions.
The federal appellate courts have yet to address this issue.80
However, numerous lower courts have examined the question of
the applicability of the plausibility standard to the affirmative
defense. Many of these courts have found the complaint-only ap-
proach persuasive, limiting the reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal to
the plaintiff ’s complaint.81 Similar to the reasoning discussed above,
these courts have concluded that “it is reasonable to impose stricter
77. See generally McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13 (“On its face, Twombly applies only
to complaints and to Rule 8(a)(2).”).
78. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
79. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; see also McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092,
at *13 (“The [Twombly] opinion does not mention affirmative defenses or any other subsection
of Rule 8. Iqbal also focused exclusively on the pleading burden that applies to plaintiffs’
complaints.”).
80. See generally Schlief v. Nu-Source, Inc., No. 10-4477 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 1560672,
at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011) (“[The plaintiff] acknowledges that no circuit court has yet
ruled that Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses.”); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787
F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (D. Kan. 2011) (“No appellate court has decided this issue, and district
courts are split.”).
81. See, e.g., Bowers v. Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 10-4141-JTM-DJW, 2011 WL
2149423, at *3-4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2011) (listing cases and adopting complaint-only approach);
Schlief, 2011 WL 1560672, at *9 (“The Court concludes that the pleading standard set forth
in Twombly and Iqbal does not apply to affirmative defenses.”); Falley, 787 F. Supp. 2d at
1256-57, 1259  (listing cases and holding that “the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal
should be limited to complaints—not extended to affirmative defenses”); Tyco Fire Prods. v.
Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to
affirmative defenses.”); FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC, No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL
883202, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) (“The Court therefore concludes that the pleading
standards of Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c).”);
Trustmark Ins. Co. v. C&K Mkt., Inc., No. CV 10-465-MO, 2011 WL 587574, at *1 (D. Or. Feb.
10, 2011) (declining “to extend the plausibility pleading requirements of Twombly to
affirmative defenses”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 592-97 (D.N.M. 2011) (declining to
extend plausibility standard to affirmative defenses). Numerous cases have addressed this
issue, and the previous list provides a few illustrative examples of courts that have declined
to apply the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.
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pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significantly more
time to develop factual support for his claims than a defendant.”82
These courts have also noted that Rule 8(c) “does not contain the
[same] language from Rule 8(a)”83 and have found that “Twombly
applies only to complaints.”84 Though the reasoning of these courts
is persuasive, it is far from conclusive, and there is an emerging
split of authority on the question of the applicability of the plausibil-
ity standard to the affirmative defense.85
In sum, the complaint-only approach concludes that the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions should not be applied beyond the context of a
plaintiff ’s complaint under Rule 8(a). This approach has serious
limitations. As discussed below, a better reading of Iqbal and
Twombly is that the decisions apply much more broadly and require
that the defendant plausibly state its affirmative defenses.
B. The All-Pleadings Approach
As the previous section shows, limiting the plausibility standard
to a plaintiff ’s federal complaint is a fair interpretation of Twombly
and Iqbal.86 And some courts have already taken this approach.87 In
the end, however, this reading should fail in favor of a much broader
interpretation of these decisions and the Federal Rules. This
broader reading would apply the plausibility standard set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal to all pleadings, including the affirmative
82. Holdsbrook v. Saia Motor Freight Line, LLC, No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB, 2010 WL
865380, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010).
83. Ameristar Fence Prods. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL
2803907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010); see also First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs.,
No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009) (“No such [‘short and plain
statement’] language, however, appears within Rule 8(c), the applicable rule for affirmative
defenses.”).
84. McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13; see also Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, No.
09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2009) (“This court does not believe that
Twombly is appropriately applied to either affirmative defenses under 8(c), or general
defenses under Rule 8(b), and declines to so extend the Supreme Court ruling as requested
by Plaintiff.”).
85. See infra Part II.B (discussing the all-pleadings approach to Rule 8(c)). See generally
Mize, supra note 59, at 1260-61 (discussing different views of lower courts on affirmative
defense question).
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See Mize, supra note 59, at 1260-61.
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defense. Like the complaint-only reading, the all-pleadings approach
can be derived from the plain terms of the Federal Rules. 
As noted earlier, Rule 8(c) addresses affirmative defenses and
requires that the defendant “affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense” when “responding to a pleading.”88 By requiring
defendants to affirmatively state their defense, this language can be
read as implicitly requiring that this stated defense also be plau-
sible. Just as the plaintiff ’s “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief” must be a plausible
statement under Twombly and Iqbal, the defendant’s statement of
its affirmative defenses could be subject to this plausibility require-
ment as well.89 The Supreme Court’s recent pleading decisions do
not turn on the language differential between Rule 8(a) and Rule
8(c)—in other words, the Court’s reasoning hinges on much more
than the requirement that the complaint include a “short and plain
statement” showing an entitlement to relief. Though the Court cer-
tainly discussed the terminology of Rule 8(a) in its decisions,90 its
analysis seems grounded much more on practical considerations
—such as the high cost of discovery and providing fair notice to
defendants—for its holding that the overall statement of the claim
must be plausible.91 Thus, just as Rule 8(a) requires the plaintiff to
plausibly state a claim to relief, similarly requiring the defendant
to plausibly state its affirmative defense is a fair reading of Rule
8(c).
This interpretation of the language in the rules is consistent with
the fact that many courts have treated a Rule 12(f) motion to strike
an affirmative defense under a standard similar to that of a motion
to dismiss a complaint. Thus, in evaluating the motion to strike, one
federal court stated that it will “evaluate the sufficiency of the
defense pursuant to a standard identical to Federal Rule of Civil
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). The time frame for responding to a complaint is relatively short,
and the “defendant must serve an answer ... within 21 days after being served with the
summons and complaint.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a).
89. See Mize, supra note 59, at 1260-61.
90. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” (citation
omitted)). But see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires
a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”). 
91. See generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
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Procedure 12(b)(6).”92 Another court noted that the defense “must
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—that is, if the defendant could
prove no set of facts in support of the affirmative defense that would
defeat the complaint, the defense must be stricken as legally
inadequate.”93 And yet another federal court unequivocally con-
cluded that “the standard by which 12(f) and 12(b)(6) motions are
evaluated are mirror images.”94 Thus, many courts have concluded
that the difference between these two rules is “academic, as the
standard is the same.”95 As claims and defenses under Rule 8(a) and
Rule 8(c) were frequently evaluated under the same standard before
Twombly and Iqbal, there seems little reason to now treat the
complaint and affirmative defense differently for purposes of a
dismissal or a motion to strike. If the language of these two rules
was considered “identical” before,96 the rules should still be treated
92. Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905 (N.D. Ill.
2006) (emphasis added); see also Zytax, Inc. v. Green Plains Renewable Energy, Inc., No. H-
09-2582, 2010 WL 2219179, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2010); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Paramont
Props., 588 F. Supp. 2d 840, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2008); In re Katrina Canal, No. 05-4182, 2007 WL
2480369, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2007); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston,
No. H-05-1047, 2006 WL 2413721, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2006) (“When a Rule 12(f) motion
to strike challenges the sufficiency of an affirmative defense, the standards for a Rule 12(f)
motion to strike and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are mirror images.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Surface Shields, Inc. v. Poly-Tak Prot. Sys., Inc., 213 F.R.D. 307, 308 (N.D. Ill 2003).
Though this “no set of facts” language obviously comes from a pre-Twombly decision, the case
makes clear that many courts treat the 12(b)(6) and the 12(f) standards similarly.
94. Credit Suisse First Bos., LLC v. Intershop Commc’ns, 407 F. Supp. 2d 541, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted); see also
United States v. Portions of Sale of Lakes Region Greyhound Park, No. 06-CV-329-JD, 2008
WL 187598, at *1 n.2 (D.N.H. Jan. 17, 2008) (“The standard of review for a 12(f) motion is
identical to that of a 12(b)(6) motion, and for this reason, whichever standard is used, the
court will reach the same result.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Safe Bed Techs. Co.
v. KCI USA, Inc., No. 02 C 0097, 2003 WL 21183948, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2003) (“Motions
to strike an affirmative defense are treated under the same legal standard as motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).
95. United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940(MBM), 2002 WL 553532, at *4 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002). See generally Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir.
1999) (“An affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements as is the
complaint.”); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“Affirmative defenses are pleadings and, therefore, are subject to all pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.... Thus, defenses must set forth a ‘short and plain
statement,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), of the defense.” (quoting Bobbitt v. Victorial House, 532 F.
Supp. 734, 736-37 (N.D. Ill. 1987))).
96. LaSalle Bank, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
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as “mirror images” now.97 To abruptly change course in light of
Twombly—and suddenly rely on the subtle distinctions in the
language between the two rules, as many courts have done98—seems
inconsistent with prior precedent and the Supreme Court decisions.
This, of course, does not foreclose the possibility that Twombly and
Iqbal somehow changed the pleading standards and that the Court
would now require more from a plaintiff ’s allegations than from a
defendant’s affirmative defenses. Nonetheless, because Twombly
itself relies on prior case law and suggests that it is not “requir[ing]
heightened fact pleading of specifics,” there seems little reason to
disturb the conclusions of earlier courts that interpreted Rule 8(a)
and Rule 8(c) under a similar standard.99 
Though Twombly and Iqbal do not specifically speak to the issue
of the affirmative defense, the reasoning of these decisions can
properly be applied in that context. In particular, the Court seemed
to develop the plausibility standard with a significant concern over
the costs that implausible litigation would impose on defendants. In
Twombly, the Court stated that discovery “can be expensive,” and
noted that “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those pro-
ceedings.”100 The Court provided that “only by taking care to require
allegations” reach a specified level “can [we] hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no ‘reason-
ably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant
evidence.’”101 In Iqbal, the Court again expressed its concern over
the potential costs of allowing certain cases to proceed to discovery,
this time in the context of the lost time of governmental officials.
The Court warned that litigation “exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that
might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of
the Government.”102 
97. Credit Suisse First Bos., LLC, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (quoting Cohen v. Elephant
Wireless, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4058(CBM), 2004 WL 1872421, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004)).
98. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
99. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
100. Id. at 558-59. The Court seemed particularly concerned about the potential discovery
costs in the type of case before it—an antitrust claim. Id.
101. Id. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).
102. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). The Iqbal Court further noted that
“[t]he costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with
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The Court’s concern over the potential cost of litigation was thus
clearly one of the primary rationales for the plausibility standard
articulated in these decisions. It is a fair concern that complex
antitrust litigation, or litigation against high-level governmental
workers, will result in expensive, time-consuming discovery for
defendants. The potential time and cost of litigation runs both ways,
however, and frivolous or implausible affirmative defenses can also
be quite expensive. Indeed, “[b]oilerplate defenses clutter docket[s];
they create unnecessary work, and in an abundance of caution
require significant unnecessary discovery.”103 A plaintiff subjected
to an implausible affirmative defense thus faces increased and
unnecessary discovery costs when forced to pursue the merits of an
implausible claim. In addition, a doubtful affirmative defense
weighs down the docket, as the court must consider the validity of
allowing the defense to proceed. Just as an implausible allegation
unnecessarily burdens the defendant with increased litigation costs,
an implausible affirmative defense results in time-consuming and
expensive discovery for the plaintiff. By adopting the plausibility
standard for affirmative defenses, “a plaintiff will not be left to the
formal discovery process to find-out [sic] whether the defense exists
and may, instead, use the discovery process for its intended purpose
of ascertaining the additional facts which support a well-pleaded
claim or defense.”104 
The cost of frivolous affirmative defenses was a significant con-
cern well before Twombly, and the lower courts are replete with
decisions requiring far more than simply a plain statement of the
defense.105 When affirmative defenses “amount to nothing more than
mere conclusions of law and are not warranted by any asserted
facts,” such defenses “have no efficacy.”106 This type of affirmative
responding to ... ‘a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the
history of the American Republic.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir.
2007)).
103. Palmer v. Oakland Farms, No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at *5.
105. See, e.g., supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
106. Shechter v. Comptroller of N.Y.C., 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Nat’l
Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Regal Prods., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 631, 634 (E.D. Wisc. 1994)); see also
LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Paramont Props., 588 F. Supp. 2d 840, 860 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“Even under
the liberal notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules, an affirmative defense must include
direct or inferential allegations as to all elements of the defense asserted.”).
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defense, which includes “‘bald assertions’ unaccompanied by sup-
porting facts,” must “be stricken.”107 In doing so, a court will “avoid
the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating
spurious issues.”108 And in striking an improper affirmative defense,
a court “will remove unnecessary clutter from the case,” thus
“serv[ing] to expedite, not delay.”109 This pre-Twombly concern over
the time and cost associated with frivolous affirmative defenses
likely led the courts to treat a motion to strike a defense under a
standard similar to a motion to dismiss a complaint, as discussed
above.110 In addition, these cost concerns—which are analogous to
the cost concerns the Court raised in Twombly and Iqbal—strongly
support extending the plausibility standard to the affirmative
defense.
In addition to the unnecessary costs of implausible litigation,
Twombly and Iqbal raised the issue of basic fairness to defendants.
The Court believed that requiring a plaintiff to do more than simply
parrot the language of a statute or assert pure legal conclusions was
reasonable.111 A plaintiff must instead state enough facts to give rise
to a plausible claim.112 The Court also required that the defendant
receive “fair notice” of the allegations against it.113 The Twombly
Court was clear that this notice “requires more than labels and con-
clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.”114 And Iqbal confirms that the plaintiff must
107. Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y Sept. 30,
2009) (quoting Shechter, 79 F.3d at 270); see also Codest Eng’g v. Hyatt Int’l Corp., 954 F.
Supp. 1224, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[A]ffirmative defenses must set forth a ‘short and plain
statement’ of the defense. If an affirmative defense is insufficient on its face or comprises no
more than ‘bare bones conclusory allegations,’ it must be stricken.” (quoting Heller Fin. v.
Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989))).
108. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. C 06-2069 SBA, 2006 WL 2711468, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2006) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also
Whittlestone v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
109. LaSalle Bank N.A., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (quoting Heller Fin., 883 F.2d at 1294)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also FDIC v. Pelletreau & Pelletreau, 965 F. Supp.
381, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Increased time and expense of trial may constitute sufficient
prejudice to warrant granting a plaintiff ’s motion to strike.”).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
111. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
112. See generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
113. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
114. Id. 
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provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”115 Thus, in fairness to the defendant, a
plaintiff must set forth enough facts in the complaint to plausibly
state a claim to relief and thereby provide the defendant with
sufficient notice of the allegations. 
Of course, fairness in litigation is a concern for plaintiffs as well,
and plaintiffs are entitled to “fair notice of the nature of the defense”
that is being asserted.116 A plaintiff that receives only a “formulaic
recitation” of the affirmative defense,117 or an “unadorned,”118 the-
plaintiff-is-not-entitled-to-relief defense, has not been given the
basic notice required under the Federal Rules. A defendant pro-
viding only these types of “‘bald assertions’ unaccompanied by
supporting facts” will not have given the plaintiff the fair notice that
Twombly and Iqbal require.119 Fairness in pleading and under the
Federal Rules should be symmetric, and a plaintiff should be en-
titled to the same level of notice of the affirmative defenses asserted
in the case as the defendant receives of the allegations against it.
The basic reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal—that fairness dictates
that a defendant receive notice of enough facts to state a plausible
claim—applies with equal force to the affirmative defense. Equity
thus requires that the plausibility standard apply not only to a
plaintiff ’s allegations, but to a defendant’s affirmative defenses as
well. As one federal court has already concluded, “‘the consider-
ations of fairness, common sense and litigation efficiency dictate’
that litigants articulate complaints and affirmative defenses
according to the same pleading standards.”120
Moreover, the forms attached to the appendix of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure likely provide some additional support for
a plausibility analysis for affirmative defenses. These forms “suffice
under the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and illustrate the
115. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
116. Codest Eng’g v. Hyatt Int’l Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
117. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
118. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
119. See Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2009) (quoting Shechter v. Comptroller of N.Y.C., 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1996)). See
generally Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
120. Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *7 (E.D. Va. July
29, 2010) (quoting Palmer v. Oakland Farms, No. 5:10cv00020, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D.
Va. June 24, 2010)).
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simplicity that these rules contemplate.”121 More specifically, Form
30 sets forth an example of an acceptable statement of an affirma-
tive defense, providing that “[t]he plaintiff ’s claim is barred by the
statute of limitations because it arose more than __ years before this
action was commenced.”122 This example contains more than a
simple statement of the defense as required by the complaint-only
reading of the statute. Such a reading would only require a state-
ment that the claim “is barred by the statute of limitations.”123
Instead, the example provides factual support for the defense
—stating that the claim arose before the time frame set forth in the
relevant statute.124 By suggesting that a proper affirmative defense
include this type of factual information, this form seems to support
the all-pleadings approach to Rule 8(c).125 Nonetheless, given the
lack of factual specificity required by the form, there is certainly
room for debate as to the extent to which the form supports the all-
pleadings approach.126 And the limited factual requirements of this
form should definitely be considered in an analysis of this issue.127 
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 84; cf. Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. Kan.
2011) (discussing Form 30); Tyco Fire Prod. v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) (same).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 30.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Francisco, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (noting that Form 30 “underscores the notion
that a defendant’s pleading of affirmative defenses should be subject to the same pleading
standard as a plaintiff ’s complaint because it includes factual assertions in the example it
provides”).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 30. It is, of course, possible that Form 30 simply “overpleads”
the affirmative defense by including factual support. In this regard, perhaps the form provides
more than is actually required under the Rules.
127. Though the defendant’s pleading obligations do appear quite minimal in this sample
form, the burden is in some ways comparable to the plaintiff ’s requirements. In this regard,
Form 11 in the appendix to the Federal Rules similarly provides that a plaintiff ’s claim for
negligence need only state that “[o]n Date, at Place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff.” FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. For a plaintiff ’s negligence claim to
survive a motion to dismiss, then, the plaintiff must state only minimal facts supporting that
claim—one short sentence. Indeed, the Twombly Court specifically approved of this form in
its decision, indicating that it would satisfy the plausibility standard. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (discussing Form 11 in its previous Form 9 version,
and stating that “[a] defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact pattern laid
out in Form 9 would know what to answer”). Thus, just as Form 11, with its limited factual
requirement for plaintiffs, has been read by the Supreme Court to satisfy the plausibility
requirement, Form 30, with its limited factual requirement for defendants, could similarly be
read as requiring the defendant to provide basic factual support for its affirmative defense.
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Finally, practical considerations strongly favor the all-pleadings
approach to Rule 8(c) over the complaint-only reading. As already
noted, from the standpoint of equity, it is fair to hold the defendant’s
affirmative defense to the same standard as the plaintiff ’s com-
plaint.128 Providing the plaintiff with some basic facts about the
defense supplies the fundamental notice required to investigate and
research the defendant’s claim. And the facts required as part of the
defendant’s statement will typically not be unduly burdensome to
provide. As Form 30 demonstrates, a short, simple sentence as-
serting the affirmative defense and providing the facts necessary to
support that defense will often suffice. In more complex cases,
however, the pleading of additional facts may be necessary.
Moreover, in many instances, the defendant will have quick
access to the information necessary to support the affirmative de-
fense. This information should frequently be within the defendant’s
own possession. Thus, asserting common affirmative defenses—
such as the statute of limitations defense discussed above—will
often not even require the defendant to engage in an exhaustive
investigation. By contrast, however, plaintiffs will typically have a
much more difficult time satisfying the plausibility standard, as
they may often not have such easy access to the required informa-
tion. An excellent example of this distinction is the showing of
discriminatory intent required by the Iqbal decision.129 Establishing
discriminatory intent can be quite difficult, particularly without
access to discovery and the depositions of those allegedly involved
in the unlawful acts.130 
Finally, it is a fair concern that defendants have significantly less
time to develop their affirmative defenses than plaintiffs have in
asserting their claims. As noted, under Rule 12(a), a party has only
twenty-one days from the date of service to answer the complaint
and set forth its affirmative defenses.131 However, given that most
See Seiner, supra note 60, at 182-83 (discussing Form 11); Joseph Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1011, 1050 (same).
128. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
129. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
130. See infra Part III.A (discussing the difficulty of establishing discriminatory intent).
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a) (setting forth the time limit to respond to a complaint); see
also Palmer v. Oakland Farms, No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24,
2010).
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of the information necessary to articulate the defense will typically
be in the defendant’s possession, this time frame should not be
particularly problematic.132 And, when the defendant—after filing
its answer—uncovers additional information necessary to support
or assert a particular defense, the courts should liberally allow that
defendant to amend pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.133 Indeed, through “flexibility of amendment” a
court “softens any painful blow” of the pleading requirements.134 Not
surprisingly, then, the “majority of cases applying the Twombly
pleading standard to affirmative defenses and striking those de-
fenses have permitted the defendant leave to amend.”135 
This is not to say that there will not be some instances in which
defendants experience difficulty uncovering information necessary
to assert a particular defense. For example, a defendant may have
to engage in some level of discovery to adequately establish an
assumption of the risk or contributory negligence defense. In these
types of cases, defendants may not always have easy access to the
information required. Just like the difficulty some plaintiffs may
face in plausibly establishing their claims without discovery, some
defendants may encounter similar problems in pleading their
defenses. In these instances, the courts should be more flexible in
allowing limited discovery on these issues or in permitting the
defendant to either amend its pleadings following discovery or
further investigate the allegations. Thus, although the all-pleadings
approach is not without its drawbacks, a symmetric approach to the
Federal Rules—applying the plausibility standard to both plaintiffs
and defendants—would provide the most equitable result. And if the
courts continue their flexible approach to certain cases, it would
132. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va.
July 29, 2010) (recognizing short time period to assert affirmative defense but noting that
“Twombly and Iqbal require only minimal facts establishing plausibility, a standard this
Court presumes most litigants would apply when conducting the abbreviated factual
investigation necessary before raising” the defense).
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (setting forth the rule on amending pleadings).
134. Francisco, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8; see also Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5
(encouraging liberal amendment and noting that “[b]y way of caveat it must be noted that
litigants do not always know all the facts relevant to their claims or to their defenses until
discovery has occurred”).
135. Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Kan. 2009).
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assure that the pleadings standards are not unfairly prejudicing
defendants.136
As discussed earlier, the federal appellate courts have yet to con-
sider this issue.137 However, a number of lower courts have adopted
this broader reading of the plausibility standard, applying the Iqbal
and Twombly reasoning to a defendant’s affirmative defenses.138
These courts have concluded that “[a]n even-handed standard” for
such defenses will require the defendant to “supply enough informa-
tion to explain the parameters of and basis for an affirmative
defense such that the adverse party can reasonably tailor discov-
ery.”139 In addition, the courts have noted that “[t]o require less of
a defendant” than a plaintiff “sets the pleading bar far too low.”140
Thus, the “[p]laintiff should not be left to discover the bare mini-
mum facts constituting a defense until discovery,”141 and “a wholly
conclusory affirmative defense is not sufficient.”142 
136. See id. at 651-52.
137. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Openmethods, LLC v. Mediu, LLC, No. 10-761-CV-W-FJG, 2011 WL
2292149, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 8, 2011) (“This Court finds this reasoning persuasive and
agrees that the Iqbal and Twombly standards should apply to affirmative defenses.”);
Palomares v. Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., No. 10-cv-6124, 2011 WL 2111978, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) (“Affirmative defenses must also contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state an affirmative defense to relief that is plausible on its face.”); J &
J Sports Prods. v. Mendoza-Govan, No. C 10-05123 WHA, 2011 WL 1544886, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 2011) (holding that plausibility standard applies to affirmative defenses); Lucas v.
Jerusalem Café, No. 4:10-cv-00582-DGK, 2011 WL 1364075, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011)
(“It makes little sense to hold defendants to a lower pleading standard than plaintiffs.”);
United States v. Brink, No. C-10-243, 2011 WL 835828, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011) (“[T]his
Court will also apply the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal in assessing
the sufficiency of affirmative defenses.”); Ulyssix Tech., Inc., v. Orbital Network Eng’g, Inc.,
No. ELH-10-02091, 2011 WL 631145, at *15 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2011) (holding that plausibility
standard applies to affirmative defenses); Nixson v. Health Alliance, No. 1:10-CV-00338, 2010
WL 5230867, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2010) (“The Court agrees with the reasoning of the
courts applying the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard to defenses.”). Numerous cases have
addressed this issue, and the previous list provides a few illustrative examples of courts that
have applied the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.
139. Francisco, 2010 WL 2990159, at *7 (quoting Burget v. Capital W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-
09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
140. Palmer v. Oakland Farms, No. 5:1cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2010).
141. Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
May 29, 2008).
142. United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 6, 2007).
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The analysis of these courts is persuasive, and the reasoning of
these cases emphasizes that the Federal Rules should be sym-
metric.143 In the end, basic considerations of equity and fairness
require that the same pleading standard be applied to both plain-
tiffs and defendants—strongly suggesting that the all-pleadings
approach to Rule 8(c) is the correct analysis of this issue.
III. AN EXAMPLE OF THE ALL-PLEADINGS APPROACH: THE
EMPLOYER’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have been enormously contro-
versial, and the federal judiciary and legal academy continue to
struggle with how to interpret and apply these decisions across the
broad spectrum of civil law.144 The plausibility standard announced
in these cases has had a notable impact in the civil rights area.145
More specifically, some plaintiffs have had difficulty satisfying this
standard in employment discrimination cases brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.146 These types of cases are fact specific and often turn on
143. See also Home Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. v. Prescient, Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV, 2007 WL
2412834, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007) (“Without some factual allegation in the affirmative
defense, it is hard to see how a defendant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only
fair notice of the nature of the defense, but also grounds on which the defense rests.” (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
generally Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
144. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009
WIS. L. REV. 535, 560 (“Twombly’s most obvious and immediate consequence has been
enormous confusion and transaction costs as a result of uncertainty about the requirements
it imposes and its scope of application.”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 60, at 859 (“Twombly
and Iqbal have introduced a wild card, a factor of substantial instability, at the threshold
stage of civil process through which all litigation must pass.”); Adam Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2010) (“[I]t was irresponsible for the Court to invite the
controversial ‘plausibility’ concept into pleading doctrine in a way that has led to such
widespread confusion.”).
145. See Hannon, supra note 42, at 1836-37.
146. See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (providing a study of the impact of Iqbal on
motions to dismiss in a wide range of cases, including employment discrimination and civil
rights); Joseph Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010); Seiner, supra note 127,
at 1027-31; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 32 (2010) (“Employment
discrimination may be one of the areas most affected by the increased role of judges in
deciding motions to dismiss.”).
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the question of discriminatory intent.147 As the Iqbal decision plainly
demonstrates, plausibly pleading discriminatory intent in a civil
rights matter can be a difficult threshold to satisfy—and this is no
less true for victims of employment discrimination.148 Given the
difficulty plaintiffs often face in articulating their workplace claims,
it stands to reason that defendants may have similar trouble re-
sponding to employment discrimination suits and establishing their
affirmative defenses in these matters. 
How the all-pleadings approach discussed above should be
applied to an affirmative defense is a fact-specific inquiry that will
hinge on the particular claim alleged in the case. A serious question
remains as to whether the plausibility standard is transsub-
stantive.149 Nonetheless, the application of this standard will depend
at least somewhat on the type of affirmative defense involved.150 For
example, the facts necessary to plausibly assert a statute of limi-
tations defense will differ greatly from the facts necessary to show
waiver. This Part explores the parameters of the plausibility stan-
dard through the lens of perhaps the most critical affirmative
defense in employment discrimination law—an employer’s defense
to sexual harassment. By examining the contours of an affirmative
defense in the area of the law most affected by Twombly and Iqbal,
this Part aims to bring to life the amorphous plausibility standard
established by these decisions.151
As a preliminary matter, though this Part examines a critical
defense under employment discrimination law, it does so only by
way of example, and many defenses to other workplace allegations
remain unexplored. Most notably, defendants often assert the di-
147. See Seiner, supra note 60; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading
Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1640-43 (2011) (discussing impact
of Twombly and Iqbal on employment discrimination cases).
148. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-52 (2009); Sullivan, supra note
147, at 1639-43.
149. See generally Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 69-70
n.98 (2010); Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 91 (2010) (“With Twombly and Iqbal, it is quite
possible that the Court implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion to the
transsubstantive character of the Rules.”).
150. As the Iqbal Court noted, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief” is “a context-specific task.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
151. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
HOW. L.J. 99, 160 (2008) (referencing the “amorphous concept of ‘plausibility’”).
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rect-threat defense to claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the good-faith defense to punitive damages in response to
employment discrimination litigation.152 By examining one impor-
tant defense, however, this Article attempts to explain how the
plausibility standard should be applied to other areas of employ-
ment law and, more importantly, how it should be applied more
broadly in all civil cases. 
A. The Faragher-Ellerth Defense to Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment has a complex and controversial history under
Title VII.153 This type of discrimination is derived from the statute’s
language, which makes it unlawful for an employer to take an
adverse action “or otherwise to discriminate against” a person “with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.”154 The statute does
not specifically mention sexual harassment, but this theory of
discrimination has been read into Title VII by the Supreme Court,
and it is also identified by the federal regulations.155
As sexual harassment arose without a clear statutory underpin-
ning, this theory of discrimination has been the source of significant
litigation.156 Over the years, however, case law has clarified what a
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2006) (“The term ‘qualification standards’ may include a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.”); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999)
(“Recognizing Title VII as an effort to promote prevention as well as remediation, and
observing the very principles underlying the Restatements’ strict limits on vicarious liability
for punitive damages, we agree that, in the punitive damages context, an employer may not
be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where
these decisions are contrary to the employer’s good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.”
(quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. See, e.g., Kenneth Pollack, Current Issues in Sexual Harassment Law, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 1009, 1010 (1995) (“[S]exual harassment has become an oft-discussed and increasingly
litigated issue.”). 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
155. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986) (referencing EEOC
guidelines on sexual harassment and holding that this theory of discrimination is viable under
Title VII); Pollack, supra note 153, at 1010 n.2 (“Although Title VII does not expressly prohibit
sexual harassment, the United States Supreme Court has held that such conduct is
discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the terms, conditions, and privileges of an
individual’s employment and thus violates Title VII.”).
156. See Theresa Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and
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plaintiff must show to prevail on a sexual harassment claim. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has established a number of factors for the
courts to consider when evaluating this type of discrimination.
Specifically, to prevail in a sexual harassment suit in which no
tangible employment action is involved,157 a plaintiff will typically
have to show that the conduct occurred because of sex, was unwel-
come, and was severe or pervasive.158 Additionally, the plaintiff
must impute liability to the employer in one of two ways. First, the
plaintiff can prove that the employer acted negligently by showing
that the defendant knew or should have known of the conduct but
failed to take appropriate remedial action—as is typically estab-
lished in coworker harassment cases.159 Alternatively, the plaintiff
can impute liability by demonstrating that a supervisor was in-
volved in the harassing conduct.160 
In its decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton161 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,162 the Supreme Court carved
out an affirmative defense for employers when the plaintiff success-
fully establishes that a supervisor created a hostile working envi-
ronment. To prevail on this affirmative defense, the employer must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following two factors:
“(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 792 (2002) (“From
its inception, sexual harassment law has been difficult to place among the other theories of
employment discrimination already developed by the courts.”).
157. When the plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer took a tangible employment
action, such as discharge or failing to promote, because of sex, vicarious liability is imputed
to the employer. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (“No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in
a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.”).
158. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-82 (1998) (discussing
“because of” requirement for sexual harassment); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (noting that the conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” (quoting Vinson, 477
U.S. at 67) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 (“The gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”).
159. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (“An employer is negligent with respect to sexual
harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”).
160. See id. at 764-65.
161. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
162. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
1018 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:987
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.”163 
Faragher and Ellerth offer a complete defense to the employer.
Thus, when the defendant is able to successfully carry its burden of
establishing the two components of the affirmative defense, the
employer may avoid all liability in the case.164
B. The All-Pleadings Approach
Under the all-pleadings approach to Rule 8(c) affirmative
defenses discussed above, a defendant must assert enough facts to
plausibly state its defense.165 As already discussed, this is a fairly
low threshold, as a defendant must simply provide enough facts to
give the plaintiff fair notice of the defense.166 What it means to sat-
isfy this plausibility standard for the sexual harassment affirmative
defense turns on each of the two necessary components of this
defense. It is useful to consider each element in turn. This Article
considers each of these elements in the context of the most straight-
forward application of the affirmative defense—when the defendant
has established a complaint procedure that the plaintiff has failed
to utilize. Given the factual nature of the defense, however, there
are almost limitless variations on how an employer might ade-
quately establish these elements. 
The first element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires the
employer to show that it used reasonable care to avoid a hostile
working environment.167 To establish this element, employers typi-
cally must demonstrate that they have adopted an antiharassment
policy and complaint procedure through which a victim of sexual
harassment could complain.168 Simply having a sexual harassment
163. Id. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
164. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages.”).
165. See supra Section II.B (discussing the all-pleadings approach to affirmative defenses).
166. See supra Section II.B (discussing the all-pleadings approach to affirmative defenses).
167. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. See generally Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 324 (2004) (“The
affirmative defense essentially requires the employer to prove that it was not negligent in
failing to prevent or correct the harassment and ... that the plaintiff was negligent in failing
to mitigate her own harm.”).
168. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“While proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
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policy in place is not enough, however, and employers must effec-
tively implement and maintain that policy.169 To be effective, a
company policy must be communicated to the employees.170 Beyond
this, however, an employer can strengthen its affirmative defense
by showing that it conducted antiharassment training and provided
education to its workers on the policies in place.171 Employers should
also consider incorporating several avenues in the policy whereby
an employee can go to complain about harassment.172 Such avenues
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”); see
also John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of ‘Vicarious’ Liability: The
Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory
Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1419
(2002) (“Preventive measures typically consist of formalized anti-harassment policies and
grievance procedures that include a harassment complaint mechanism.”).
169. See Paul Buchanan & Courtney Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of Workplace
Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
Title VII, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 63 (1999) (“The existence of an effective and enforced
anti-harassment policy will be the centerpiece of an employer’s defense.”).
170. See Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he availability of
the affirmative defense often will turn on whether the employer had established and
disseminated an anti-discrimination policy, complete with a known complaint procedure.”);
Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 169, at 63 (“It is critical that the employer be able to
establish that its policy was effectively communicated to all employees.”); Nancy R. Mansfield
& Joan T.A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher Affirmative Defense: When
Are Employers Liable?, 19 LAB. LAW. 107, 121 (2003) (noting that courts consider “whether
... the employer distributed the anti-harassment policy”); Heather Murr, The Continuing
Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An
Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 622 (2006) (“[T]he
trier of fact should ascertain whether the employer maintained an antiharassment policy and,
if so, whether the victim knew of the employer’s antiharassment policy.”).
171. See Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 169, at 64 (“Employers should regularly conduct
training to educate employees about harassment and company policies.”); Joanna L.
Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L.
REV. 671, 697 (2000) (“Reasonable care to prevent harassment may also require employers to
offer employees training sessions about the new policy and procedures or about sexual
harassment in general.”); see also Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1062
(10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he existence of a sexual harassment policy and training alone does not
satisfy the employer’s burden under the first prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.”). 
172. See Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 169, at 63 (“The policy should provide multiple
avenues for an employee to report inappropriate conduct and to seek help.”); David Sherwyn
et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your ‘1-800’ Harassment Hotline: An Empirical
Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment
Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2001) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of cases holds
that an employer exercises reasonable care when it has a policy that is disseminated to all
employees, and it provides employees with an opportunity to report the harassment to
someone other than a harassing supervisor.”).
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can include just about any company official, a human resources
worker, or even an anonymous messaging service.173 The policy
should be updated frequently, and those with authority to respond
to complaints should understand their role in preventing workplace
discrimination.174 An effective policy should also make clear that
retaliation against those who avail themselves of the complaint
procedure will not be tolerated.175 
In all, to have a policy that satisfies the Faragher-Ellerth stan-
dard, an employer must reasonably tailor its procedures to the
particular working environment and do its best to eradicate dis-
crimination by encouraging victims of harassment to utilize an
effective complaint process.176 One survey of federal court decisions
concluded that when an employer is able to show that it has
implemented an antiharassment policy and complaint process, and
when that employer has “evidence of reasonable efforts to investi-
gate all sexual harassment grievances,” many courts have concluded
that the first element of the defense is satisfied.177
Thus, to plausibly state the first element of the Faragher-Ellerth
affirmative defense, employers should allege, at a minimum, the
following facts in their responsive pleading: (1) that the company
has implemented and effectively maintained a policy prohibiting
harassment and (2) that the policy includes a complaint process of
which the plaintiff could have availed herself. Depending upon the
nature of the case and the specifics of the allegations involved, the
173. See also Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have held
that an employer exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment where it distributed its
antiharassment policy to all of its employees, and the policy’s complaint procedure identified
three company officials to whom harassment could be reported.” (quoting Gordon v. Shafer
Contracting Co., 469 F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)). 
174. See Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 169, at 63-64.
175. See id. (“The policy should also contain a strong statement making clear that the
employer will not in any way retaliate against any person reporting or confirming the
existence of harassing acts in the workplace.” (citation omitted)).
176. See Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 170, at 122 (“[C]ourts have noted situations in
which the employer did not reasonably tailor their policies to prevent or correct alleged
harassment.”); see also Minix v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 237 F. App’x 578, 584 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e
have consistently held that where an employer promulgates a comprehensive anti-harassment
policy—one that is effectively communicated to employees and that contains reasonable
complaint procedures—the employer has satisfied its burden on the prevention prong of the
first element.”).
177. See Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 170, at 121.
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defendant should also strongly consider pleading any additional
facts that would bolster its defense. Such additional facts could in-
clude whether the employer conducted sexual harassment training,
the extent to which the policy was communicated to the plaintiff and
the defendant’s other workers, and the fact that multiple avenues
of complaint were available to the plaintiff. 
Of course, this list is not exhaustive, and the defendant should
plead any specific facts about the policy that demonstrate that the
company appropriately tailored the complaint procedure to its
particular working environment. Moreover, in those instances in
which the plaintiff did complain pursuant to the policy, the em-
ployer should indicate any relevant facts showing that the company
response was reasonable in attempting to “correct” the situation.178
By providing these facts in the responsive pleading, all of which
should be well within the employer’s knowledge at the time the
answer is filed, the defendant will have clearly articulated to the
plaintiff the nature of its defense and will have plausibly stated the
first element of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. 
The second element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires the
employer to show that the plaintiff “unreasonably failed” to avail
herself of “any preventive or corrective opportunities” offered by the
defendant or that the plaintiff failed to “avoid harm otherwise.”179
To establish this element, an employer should show that despite
being aware of the policy, the plaintiff nonetheless unreasonably
failed to properly complain through the channels established by
the employer.180 What is “unreasonable” conduct on the part of the
employee is obviously a highly fact-intensive inquiry. This element
is often satisfied, however, by showing that the plaintiff simply
failed to complain at all when a proper policy was in place.181 In this
178. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). As noted earlier, however,
this Article primarily contemplates the most straightforward application of the Faragher-
Ellerth defense in which the defendant has established a complaint procedure that the
plaintiff has failed to use. See supra Part III.B.
179. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
180. Id. (“And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of
reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”).
181. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 242 (2004) (“When the plaintiff does not
report the harassment to her employer, the employer often prevails on its motion for summary
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regard, Faragher makes clear that a plaintiff ’s unreasonable failure
to use the company-established complaint process “will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of
the defense.”182 Demonstrating that the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to complain is thus the most straightforward way of establishing
this prong of the affirmative defense.183 It is worth noting that this
element can be strengthened when the company has established
multiple channels for the plaintiff to complain and when the plain-
tiff has failed to use any of these available avenues.184 A defendant
will also have a stronger defense when the alleged harasser is not
one of those designated to receive complaints under the policy,185
though this issue is certainly not dispositive when the employer has
established alternative avenues for the worker to complain.186 
Beyond showing that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to com-
plain, the alternative methods of establishing the second element of
the defense are much less clear. Indeed, given the fact-specific
nature of the working environment, the various types of policies an
employer might implement, and the range of ways that an employee
could respond to a hostile working atmosphere, there are numerous
possible approaches to establishing this second element. As dis-
cussed earlier, this Article primarily contemplates those situations
in which the plaintiff has failed to complain.187 It should be noted,
judgment or judgment as a matter of law.”); see also Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d
27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (“There is no bright-line rule as to when a failure to file a complaint
becomes unreasonable, but Faragher and Ellerth do provide indirect guidance.... [M]ore than
ordinary fear or embarrassment is needed.”). 
182. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (emphasis added); see also
ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 517 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing
affirmative defense).
183. See Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 170, at 124 (“District and circuit courts have
generally found that the employer will prevail [on the second prong] if either (1) a reasonable
person in the employee’s position would have come forward earlier or to a designated manager
in order to prevent the harassment from becoming more severe or (2) the employee fails
entirely to report the harassment.” (citations omitted)).
184. See Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 169, at 63.
185. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (discussing problems with employer’s sexual
harassment policy, including that it “did not include any assurance that the harassing
supervisors could be bypassed in registering complaints”).
186. See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[Plaintiff] provides no support for her argument that an employer’s designation of one
avenue for complaints in its sexual harassment policy forecloses the possibility of making
complaints elsewhere.”).
187. See supra Part III.B.
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however, that even when the plaintiff filed an internal complaint,
the defendant may still be able to avail itself of the affirmative
defense.188 In these scenarios, the employer should plead those facts
supporting its argument that its response to the complaint was ap-
propriate and reasonable.189 Additional facts that could strengthen
this argument include whether the plaintiff failed to report the
harassment “in a timely manner” or whether the plaintiff reported
the harassment through the proper channels.190
The Court also created an alternative avenue to establish the
second element of the defense—in which defendants can show that
the plaintiff failed to “avoid harm otherwise.”191 In Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court was not particularly clear as to what would
satisfy this alternative to the second component of the affirmative
defense.192 Not surprisingly, the case law and academic literature
have provided little guidance on the parameters of this part of the
defense.193 Like the other considerations of the Faragher-Ellerth
defense, this is likely a fact-intensive inquiry. Given the ambiguity
surrounding this particular alternative component of the defense,
it is unclear exactly what facts the defendant would need to allege
to plausibly plead that the plaintiff failed to “avoid harm other-
wise.”194 Nonetheless, when the plaintiff ’s conduct may suggest a
188. See Lawton, supra note 181, at 242-43 (“Even when a plaintiff does report harassment,
however, many federal courts interpret prong two of the affirmative defense in ways that
make it easier for an employer to prove that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
avail herself of her employer’s internal reporting mechanisms.”).
189. See id. (discussing various approaches of the courts in their treatment of the second
prong of the affirmative defense when the plaintiff complains under an employer’s policy).
190. See Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 170, at 125-27.
191. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
192. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998).
193. See Margaret E. Johnson, “Avoiding Harm Otherwise”: Reframing Women Employees’
Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 752 (2007) (“To date,
most courts and scholars have not recognized the meaning and potential power of the ‘avoid
harm otherwise’ component of the affirmative defense.”). 
194. See also BELTON ET AL., supra note 182, at 518-19 (discussing the “avoid harm
otherwise” language from the Supreme Court); cf. id. at 788-89 (“[M]any courts simply fail to
consider whether the employee ‘avoided harm otherwise’ when analyzing the affirmative
defense. This failure is a result of either conflating the two components of the employee-
focused prong into one component or truncating the prong to exclude the ‘avoid harm
otherwise’ component altogether.”).
1024 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:987
failure to avoid harm, or a willingness to put one’s self in harm’s
way, the defendant should plead these facts as part of its answer. 
In sum, to plead the second element of the affirmative defense, an
employer must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that the
plaintiff “unreasonably failed” to avail herself of “any preventive or
corrective opportunities” offered by the defendant or that the plain-
tiff failed to “avoid harm otherwise.”195 This will usually be done by
alleging facts that show that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to
avail herself of an effective complaint process established by the
employer.196 However, there are numerous other ways that a de-
fendant could sufficiently plead this second element of the defense. 
C. Summary of the All-Pleadings Approach 
As discussed above, to properly assert an affirmative defense to
a hostile work environment claim, a defendant must establish the
two elements of the Faragher-Ellerth test. At a minimum, defendant
can plausibly plead the first element of this defense by alleging facts
establishing that the company implemented and effectively main-
tained an antiharassment policy and complaint procedure. Pleading
additional facts, such as including information as to any sexual
harassment training conducted by the employer, the extent to which
the employer communicated an antidiscrimination policy to em-
ployees, and whether the employer made multiple channels of
complaint available to the plaintiff, could strengthen this defense.
A defendant can plausibly plead the second element of the
Faragher-Ellerth defense by alleging facts that establish that the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to complain pursuant to the employer’s
policy. Though this is the most straightforward articulation of the
defense—as well as the formulation contemplated by this Article—
additional facts must be alleged when the plaintiff has complained.
Such facts would vary depending upon the nature of the case but
195. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
196. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 787 (“[I]n deciding liability for supervisor sexual
harassment cases, the courts to date have focused primarily on the limited questions of
whether the employer had a policy, and, if so, whether the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to use the formal complaint mechanism pursuant to the policy.”).
2012] PLAUSIBILITY BEYOND THE COMPLAINT 1025
could include whether the plaintiff failed to timely report the
harassment or failed to report it through the proper channels.197 
The following example will help illustrate the type of allegations
a defendant could assert in a responsive pleading to satisfy the
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense to a claim of sexual harass-
ment. To plausibly plead this defense, an employer could allege
that: 
The defendant is entitled to an affirmative defense to any
finding of sexual harassment. The defendant in this case
established and disseminated a comprehensive anti-discrim-
ination policy to all employees—including the plaintiff—which
included a statement against harassment in the workplace. This
policy specified several channels where the plaintiff could
complain, none of which involved the alleged harasser in this
case. Despite having acknowledged receipt of the policy and
complaint procedure, the plaintiff unreasonably failed to
complain to any manager of the company, or to any individual
specified in the policy. 
This clear-cut example demonstrates the type of simple, straightfor-
ward statement that would satisfy the plausibility standard for
pleading the sexual harassment affirmative defense. The defen-
dant’s statement of the affirmative defense need not be long or
involve extensive details. A short paragraph summarizing the basic
elements of the defense—why the defendant acted reasonably and
the plaintiff unreasonably—should suffice. Yet the statement
succeeds in providing the necessary information about the defense
to the plaintiff, who will now be able to tailor her discovery to the
specific factors alleged by the defendant. Indeed, the above state-
ment includes information relating to what defense is being
asserted (“an affirmative defense to ... sexual harassment”), the
basis for the defense (employer policy and failure to complain), and
provides specifics about the policy itself (communicated to all
employees, included multiple channels of complaint, harasser not
197. In addition, as discussed, a defendant can satisfy the second element of the defense
by pleading facts that establish that the plaintiff failed to avoid the harm—though the case
law is unclear as to the parameters of this component of the defense. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
765.
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named in policy). In addition, a simple internal investigation by the
employer would typically reveal all of the information alleged above. 
It is worth emphasizing a key limitation of the above example.
Most notably, this illustration provides just one way—though
perhaps one of the most common ways—of asserting this defense.
Thus, the example illustrates how a defendant would allege the
defense in those scenarios in which an antiharassment policy exists
and the plaintiff has failed to complain pursuant to that policy. As
noted earlier, however, there are countless possible variations of
this defense.198 For example, when the plaintiff did in fact complain,
a defendant should include additional facts to demonstrate that the
company attempted to “correct” the situation.199 This and other
possible variations further demonstrate the fact-intensive nature of
the plausibility standard announced by the Supreme Court, which
appears somewhat malleable to the allegations of the particular
case.200
It is also worth considering that individual courts may read Iqbal
as requiring even more than what is set forth above.201 Thus,
although the above example attempts to illustrate what should be
required of a defendant when pleading the affirmative defense to
sexual harassment, some courts could require even greater detail.202
For example, a court might find the statement that the “plaintiff
unreasonably failed to complain” to be overly generalized and thus
require specific facts from the defendant supporting this particular
assertion. Suffice it to say that the law will be unsettled for a while
following Twombly and Iqbal, and the courts are likely to take
varying approaches as to what level of specificity is needed to satisfy
the pleading standard.203 Nonetheless, the example above provides
198. See supra Part III.B.
199. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
200. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). As noted earlier, however, a serious question remains as to whether the
plausibility standard is transsubstantive. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
201. Similarly, some courts might require less than what is set forth above, though these
courts may be inclined to follow the complaint-only approach discussed below.
202. See generally Sullivan, supra note 147 (discussing impact of Iqbal and Twombly on
employment discrimination cases).
203. See generally Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 60 (discussing the impact of the
plausibility standard).
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a straightforward and reasonable interpretation of what plausibility
pleading should look like in the sexual harassment context.
In sum, this discussion makes clear that defendants should not
have substantial difficulty plausibly pleading the affirmative de-
fense to sexual harassment claims. Defending sexual harassment
claims is one of the most complex and involved areas of employment
discrimination law.204 Nonetheless, a short, simple paragraph out-
lining the defense, even in this intricate area of the law, should
satisfy this standard and provide sufficient notice to the plaintiff of
the defense being alleged. And most, if not all, of these facts would
be within the defendant’s knowledge at the time the answer is filed. 
D. The Complaint-Only Reading
By way of contrast, the complaint-only approach would result in
a significantly different result for sexual harassment defendants. As
noted earlier, this approach takes a much narrower view of
Twombly and Iqbal and would limit the plausibility standard to civil
pleadings filed by plaintiffs.205 This approach takes Rule 8(c)
completely at face value and would require no more than that an
employer “affirmatively state any ... affirmative defense” in its
answer.206
Under the complaint-only approach, then, an employer defending
against a hostile work environment claim would only be required to
provide a basic statement of its affirmative defense. The following
sample pleading would comply with this approach:
The defendant is entitled to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative
defense for hostile work environment claims.
The stark contrast between the examples of a satisfactory
pleading under the complaint-only reading and a satisfactory
pleading pursuant to the all-pleadings approach underscores the
importance of this issue. The all-pleadings approach clearly requires
much more of an employer and would likely necessitate that the
company conduct at least a minimal investigation into the nature of
the purported discrimination. In addition, the all-pleadings
204. See supra Part III.A.
205. See supra Part II.A (discussing complaint-only reading of Supreme Court decisions).
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
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approach provides the plaintiff with significantly more information
about the defense being asserted. 
There are certainly intermediary approaches that the courts could
take on this issue. It would undoubtedly be reasonable for a court to
require more than a statement of a legal conclusion as to any
affirmative defense but less than what is required under the all-
pleadings approach.207 Of course, adopting this type of gray area
between a legal conclusion and a plausible statement could be
particularly difficult to define. As the courts will likely grapple with
the plausibility standard for years, adopting a hybrid approach
could potentially result in even more litigation on this issue.208
 IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALL-PLEADINGS APPROACH FOR ALL
CIVIL CASES
There are numerous implications of applying the plausibility
standard to affirmative defenses in all civil cases.209 As explained in
greater detail below, the example of the affirmative defense to
hostile work environment claims helps provide context to many of
these implications. 
Perhaps the most significant benefit of the all-pleadings approach
is the simplicity and symmetry that it provides. By imposing the
same pleading standard on plaintiffs and defendants, the require-
ments of the parties would be symmetrical. Thus, as the case law
continues to develop as to the meaning of plausibility under the
Federal Rules, this meaning could be applied to both parties in most
civil cases. In this way, the courts and litigants could look to the
same body of case law when evaluating the sufficiency of a party’s
207. Dann v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[E]ven before
Twombly and Iqbal, affirmative defenses had to provide the plaintiff with fair notice of the
nature of the defense.... [I]t was also the case that bare bones conclusory allegations could be
stricken.” (citations omitted)).
208. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 142 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/
dodson.pdf (“So, one thing is certain after Bell Atlantic: it will spawn years of increased
litigation.”).
209. The qualified immunity defense is particularly cumbersome and the analysis of this
specific defense is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., John M. Greabe, Iqbal, Al-Kidd
and Pleading Past Qualified Immunity: What the Cases Mean and How They Demonstrate a
Need to Eliminate the Immunity Doctrines from Constitutional Tort Law, 20 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1 (2011).
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pleadings. This approach would simply restore the way many courts
viewed the standards for dismissing a complaint or an affirmative
defense before Twombly and Iqbal—as identical.210 The alternative
approach would require developing two separate tracks of analysis,
one for plaintiffs and another for defendants, to determine whether
a particular pleading satisfies the Federal Rules.211 
Along these same lines, the all-pleadings approach promotes
fairness and equity in court proceedings. In Twombly and Iqbal, the
Court required the plaintiffs to set forth enough facts in the
pleadings to plausibly state a claim to relief and thereby provide the
defendant with “fair notice” of the allegations.212 Fairness also
dictates that a plaintiff receive enough facts about a defendant’s
affirmative defense to provide that plaintiff with a basic under-
standing of the contours of the defense.213 By holding both parties
accountable to the same pleading standard, neither party has an
actual or perceived advantage at the earlier stages of the litigation.
In addition, both parties will have been provided with fair notice of
the nature of the allegations of the opposing side.
As demonstrated in the sexual harassment example discussed
above, the all-pleadings approach also increases the flow of informa-
tion in the case.214 A defendant that must plausibly plead enough
facts to state a defense has to provide the plaintiff with much more
information than it would under the complaint-only approach.215
This creates additional efficiencies in the litigation, as plaintiffs
receiving more details about a defense will be able to tailor their
210. See, e.g., Reis Robotics USA, Inc. v. Concept Indus., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[W]e evaluate the sufficiency of the [affirmative] defense pursuant to a
standard identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”); see also supra notes 93-96
and accompanying text (discussing approach of federal courts pre-Twombly and Iqbal when
evaluating a complaint or an affirmative defense).
211. For an interesting look at the question whether plaintiffs must “establish the
inapplicability of any affirmative defense” in their complaint, see Greabe, supra note 209, at
27 (emphasis added). For an additional view, see also David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of
Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 136-37 (2010).
212. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
214. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the plausibility standard would be applied to
sexual harassment affirmative defense).
215. See supra Part III.D (contrasting between the complaint-only approach and the all-
pleadings approach to affirmative defenses in the context of a sexual harassment claim). 
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discovery to the specific factors that the defendant alleged.216 This
information thus gives plaintiffs at least a starting point to begin
exploring the parameters of the asserted defense. And, as already
discussed, this information flows both ways, as plaintiffs and
defendants will be required to provide at least the basic facts
relating to their arguments for the case.217
Moreover, allowing the courts to quickly identify any implausible
defenses early in the case will lead to additional efficiencies. This
will save the parties—and the courts—the time spent exploring
these defenses in discovery and in the motions of the litigants.
Rather than allowing baseless claims to proceed, the courts can
reject these implausible defenses early in the case and focus on the
more important aspects of the litigation. The potential time and cost
of unnecessary discovery was one of the primary rationales for the
plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal for plain-
tiffs, and those concerns would apply equally in the context of a
defendant’s affirmative defense.218 Just as the plausibility standard
will help streamline a civil case and save defendants the time and
cost of needless litigation, this standard will similarly help focus
discovery on those defenses that have some likelihood of success.
As fairness, equity, and the free flow of information all support a
plausibility analysis of affirmative defenses, many of the objections
to this approach are likely to be more practical in nature. Thus,
some might argue that the all-pleadings approach is unfair to
defendants given the relatively short time period they have to
respond to a complaint under the Federal Rules.219 As discussed
earlier, however, most of the information necessary to adequately
allege the affirmative defense will often be in the defendant’s own
possession, thus requiring only a minimal investigation.220 And
216. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *7 (E.D. Va.
July 29, 2010).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
218. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (discussing the “heavy costs [of
litigation] in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007) (discussing high cost of discovery).
219. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a) (setting forth the time limit to respond to a complaint). 
220. See supra Part III. A defendant would often undertake a comprehensive investigation
even in the absence of the plausibility standard. See infra notes 225-27, 245-46 and
accompanying text. This would likely be true, for example, in the context of an internal sexual
harassment complaint. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO.
915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL
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given that the plausibility standard should require only limited
factual pleading by the defendant, this short response time frame
should not be particularly problematic.221 Finally, as Twombly and
Iqbal raise the pleading bar for defendants under the approach
discussed in this Article, the courts should continue to liberally
allow leave to amend the pleadings when the parties discover
additional facts later in the case.222 
An additional objection to the all-pleadings approach would likely
be the added cost it creates for defendants. The requirement that a
defendant plead sufficient facts to support its defense would often
require at least an internal investigation into the allegations.223 This
investigation would create an additional expense for the defendant.
This potential cost is in many ways illusory, however. Depending on
the nature of the allegations—and even in the absence of the plau-
sibility standard—a defendant will typically conduct an investiga-
tion of the plaintiff ’s accusations upon receipt of the complaint.224
This investigation could even be broader in scope than what is nec-
essary to present an affirmative defense. Indeed, the defendant’s
investigation would likely target the more comprehensive ques-
tion of whether any wrongdoing occurred at all.225 Moreover, an
HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harass
ment.html (addressing internal investigations); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 57 (2003) (“In essence, the affirmative defense requires that sexual
harassment disputes be investigated and resolved internally before proceeding to court.”);
Amy Payne, Note, Protecting the Accused in Sexual Harassment Investigations: Is the Fair
Credit Reporting Act an Answer?, 87 VA. L. REV. 381, 392-93 (2001) (discussing investigations
of sexual harassment complaints). See generally Nancy L. Abell & Marcia Nelson Jackson,
Sexual Harassment Investigations—Cues, Clues and How-To’s, 12 LAB. LAW. 17 (1996) (same).
221. See Francisco, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (recognizing the short time period to assert
affirmative defense, but noting that “Twombly and Iqbal require only minimal facts
establishing plausibility, a standard this Court presumes most litigants would apply when
conducting the abbreviated factual investigation necessary before raising” the defense).
222. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (setting forth the rule on amending pleadings); Francisco,
2010 WL 2990159, at *8; Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179,
at *5 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Kan.
2009) (“The majority of cases applying the Twombly pleading standard to affirmative defenses
and striking those defenses have permitted the defendant leave to amend.”).
223. See supra Part III.
224. This investigation may occur even earlier, when the defendant has been informed of
potential wrongdoing prior to a federal complaint being filed. See infra note 246. See generally
Grossman, supra note 220, at 57-64 (discussing internal investigations of sexual harassment).
225. By way of example, only a limited internal investigation would typically be required
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investigation into the specific facts necessary to support an affirma-
tive defense could be quite limited in nature. In many instances, the
investigation need not extend beyond the information already
within the defendant’s own possession.226
This is not to say that instances will not arise in which the
defendant must conduct a more expansive investigation into the
facts of the case to support its affirmative defense. As noted earlier
by way of example, a requirement that the defendant plausibly
plead the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence or as-
sumption of the risk might require defendants to engage in at least
some discovery, and this will unquestionably create significant
additional expense for the defendant.227 In these particular situa-
tions, however, plaintiffs are entitled to a clear picture of what the
affirmative defense looks like, even if this requires the defendant to
spend substantial time and resources investigating the matter.
Imposing these additional costs on defendants in the context of the
affirmative defense is in many ways no different than subjecting
plaintiffs to the initial costs of uncovering enough facts to plausibly
plead the complaint. Thus, although there may be some instances
in which a defendant incurs substantial expense as a result of
adopting the all-pleadings approach, these costs would be symmetric
under the Federal Rules. And imposing these costs would serve the
goal of providing both parties with additional information early in
the case.
Similarly, there may be some concern that the all-pleadings
approach would result in a significant increase in motions to strike,
which could slow down court proceedings.228 Although this is
certainly a reasonable concern, it does not detract from the fact that
plaintiffs are entitled to be provided with a plausible basis for any
to uncover the facts necessary to adequately plead the affirmative defense to a claim of a
hostile work environment. See infra text accompanying notes 245-46.
226. See supra Part III.
227. See supra Part II.B (discussing the all-pleadings approach to affirmative defenses).
228. See Bowers v. Mort. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 10-4141-JTM-DJW, 2011 WL
2149423, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2011) (“Granting these motions to strike may encourage
parties to bog down litigation by filing and fighting motions to strike answers or defenses
prematurely which cuts against the purpose of Rule 12(f): ‘minimize delay, prejudice, and
confusion.’” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D.
581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011) (“Applying [Twombly and Iqbal] to affirmative defenses would also
invite many more motions to strike, which achieves little.”).
2012] PLAUSIBILITY BEYOND THE COMPLAINT 1033
affirmative defense asserted under a fair reading of the Federal
Rules and the recent Supreme Court cases. And when the plaintiff
is simply filing frivolous motions in the case, the court is free to
sanction the party doing so to help limit this result.229 Moreover,
without sufficient factual support, “[b]oilerplate defenses clutter the
docket and, further, create unnecessary work.”230 And perhaps most
importantly, the Supreme Court did not appear concerned that its
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal would result in an increase in
motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaints.231 Taking an equitable
approach to these decisions, then, there should similarly be little
concern over the possible result that Twombly and Iqbal will lead to
an increased filing of motions to strike a defendant’s affirmative
defenses.
One final objection to the all-pleadings analysis may be that this
approach could force defendants to settle otherwise unmeritorious
claims. Some might argue that the additional time and expense a
defendant must undertake to properly assert its defenses would
simply encourage that defendant to settle the matter early on. The
Twombly Court was particularly cognizant of this concern from the
standpoint of frivolous litigation, noting that “the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases” early in the proceedings.232 And it is certainly true that many
defendants might settle a frivolous case to avoid the time and
expense of discovery.233 In the context of the affirmative defense,
however, the additional cost to the defendant of investigating the
basic facts about its defense should be minimal.234 This is particu-
larly true when compared to the enormous costs with which the
Court was concerned—those expenses associated with discovery in
a federal court proceeding.235 In many cases, then, there seems little
229. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
230. Ulyssix Tech. v. Orbital Network Eng’g, Inc., No. ELH-10-02091, 2011 WL 631145, at
*15 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48399, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008)).
231. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007); CECIL ET AL., supra note 146 (discussing empirical analysis of motion to
dismiss filings before and after Iqbal).
232. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
233. See id. at 559-60.
234. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text; infra notes 245-46 and accompanying
text.
235. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59.
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danger that the additional cost of plausibly pleading an affirmative
defense will push a defendant into settlement. 
Moreover, the corollary to the Supreme Court’s concern about
frivolous litigation forcing a defendant to settle a case should be
considered. Just as the threat of discovery could push a defendant
to settle an implausible claim, a baseless affirmative defense could
similarly encourage a plaintiff with a strong case to unnecessarily
settle early in the proceedings or to settle for less than the true
value of the claim.236 Requiring a defendant to plead at least the
basic facts relating to the defense would help guard against this un-
just result, as it could help “avoid the potentially enormous expense
of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the
discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.”237 
A final implication of adopting the all-pleadings approach should
be considered—the often negligible factual requirement that this
standard imposes. In many ways, the plausibility standard requires
that a defendant provide only the most basic facts related to the
defense. As one federal court surmised when addressing the defen-
dant’s obligations under the affirmative defense, “Twombly and
Iqbal require only minimal facts establishing plausibility.”238 The
ease with which defendants can often satisfy the standard is seen
in the example provided for hostile work environment claims—a
short paragraph setting forth the basic facts of the affirmative
defense satisfies the plausibility standard in that context.239 And, as
discussed earlier, the basic requirements of the statute of limita-
tions example set forth in the Federal Rules also make clear just
how minimal these pleading requirements should be for defen-
dants.240 The simple paragraph required for the affirmative defense
to sexual harassment, combined with the simple sentence required
in the example provided by the Federal Rules, demonstrates just
how undemanding the plausibility requirement will typically be for
236. See supra Part II.B (discussing the costs associated with implausible affirmative
defenses).
237. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
238. Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. July
29, 2010).
239. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the plausibility standard would be applied to
sexual harassment affirmative defense).
240. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 30 (“The plaintiff ’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations
because it arose more than __ years before this action was commenced.”).
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defendants. The standard is meant to promote fairness and equity
in pleading and typically should not create burdensome obligations
for defendants. This is not to say that some courts applying the
plausibility standard would not require a higher level of pleading
than what is suggested here.241 Nonetheless, this Article outlines
what should be an appropriate approach to plausibly pleading the
affirmative defense—an approach that would typically not be
burdensome for defendants.
The example of the hostile work environment affirmative defense
discussed above provides a clear illustration of some of the implica-
tions of the all-pleadings approach discussed here.242 Just as a plain-
tiff alleging a claim of sexual harassment against her employer
would be required to plausibly plead enough facts to state a claim,
an employer would similarly be required to provide the plaintiff
with the fundamental facts related to the basic nature of its affirm-
ative defense.243 All parties would thus receive critical background
information about the claims and defenses in the case, which would
allow these parties to much more narrowly tailor their discovery. In
the sexual harassment context, then, this approach would clearly
enhance the amount of information provided early in the case and
provide symmetry to the pleading requirements of employers and
employees.244 
Despite being required to provide this additional information,
however, employers should easily—and inexpensively—be able to
comply with the all-pleadings approach in hostile work environment
cases. It is true that this reading of the recent Supreme Court cases
may result in some additional expense to employers. Requiring
defendants to plausibly plead their affirmative defenses will likely
require these defendants to conduct at least a minimal investigation
241. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (discussing potential variations of court
approaches to plausibly pleading an affirmative defense).
242. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the plausibility standard would be applied to
sexual harassment affirmative defense).
243. Though the additional burden this approach puts on employers will often be minimal,
the amount of additional information provided to the employee is significant. A plaintiff
beginning discovery in this type of case will much more easily be able to target the employer’s
harassment policies and procedures, as well as those individuals with knowledge of how the
complaint procedure was utilized in the particular case.
244. See supra Part III.D (discussing the contrast between the complaint-only approach
and the all-pleadings approach to affirmative defenses in the context of a sexual harassment
claim).
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into the plaintiff ’s allegations.245 This investigation will reveal those
background facts necessary to plausibly support the alleged
affirmative defense. This approach may thus result in additional
costs incurred by the employer to conduct that preliminary
investigation—costs which would not necessarily have been present
if the defendant were permitted to plead its affirmative defense in
a conclusory manner. 
Nonetheless, these costs should be minimal, as uncovering
whether a company antiharassment policy exists and whether the
plaintiff availed herself of that policy typically requires only a
simple investigation. And in practice, the employer will likely
conduct an even more sophisticated investigation to determine the
merit of the plaintiff ’s harassment allegations in the case and
whether a broader employment problem exists at the company.246
Moreover, if the case were to proceed to discovery, the costs to the
defendant would likely be the same under either the complaint-only
or the all-pleadings approach, as the defendant would certainly
conduct an investigation into its possible defenses at this later stage
of the litigation. 
Thus, the most likely objections to the all-pleadings approach—
additional time and expense for defendants—should not be of
particular concern for employers in a hostile work environment
case. A routine investigation—which would likely be conducted even
in the absence of the plausibility standard—should quickly and
easily provide those background facts necessary for an employer to
sufficiently plead its affirmative defense. All of the required infor-
mation should also be within the employer’s own knowledge, and an
internal investigation of the company’s antiharassment policies and
its response in the particular case should reveal all of the necessary
facts to support the affirmative defense.
245. See supra Part III.D.
246. In reality, the defendant will often conduct an investigation before discovery has even
begun in the case. Depending upon the nature of the allegations, many defendants would
typically launch an investigation upon receiving notice of the alleged wrongdoing. See
generally Grossman, supra note 220, at 57-64 (discussing internal investigations of sexual
harassment). This is particularly true in the employment discrimination context, when an
employer will likely have received a discrimination charge long before litigation is actually
filed in the case. See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 127, at 1049 n.253 (“Title VII claims are different
from many other civil causes of action in that the defendant typically will have received notice
of the relevant allegation of discrimination long before a federal complaint is ever filed.”).
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This is not to say that in other contexts the all-pleadings ap-
proach to affirmative defenses would not have the potential of
creating significant additional time and expense for defendants.
This example simply illustrates that in certain employment dis-
crimination cases—an area of the law significantly affected by
Twombly and Iqbal—a plausibility requirement for defendants may
not be unduly burdensome. And, this is true in perhaps the most
complex and important defense available to employers in these
cases: the affirmative defense to hostile work environment claims. 
Given that this plausibility standard can easily be applied to
employers in these complex cases, it is fair to consider applying this
plausibility analysis beyond this context to all civil cases. Such an
approach is well supported by principles of equity, fairness, and
efficiency—as well as a textual reading of the Federal Rules.
Although the courts are currently in conflict over whether to apply
the plausibility standard to a defendant’s affirmative defense,247
policy considerations seem to make clear that the standard should
apply equally to all parties in the case.
CONCLUSION
An equitable approach to civil procedure would impose the same
pleading standards on both plaintiffs and defendants, and this is
exactly what many courts had done in the years leading up to
Twombly and Iqbal. A close textual review of the Federal Rules
supports this approach. Significant policy and practical consider-
ations further suggest that a defendant must plausibly plead its
affirmative defenses. Whether the plausibility standard should
apply to a defendant’s responsive pleadings, and more problemati-
cally how that standard would apply, are certain to be sources of
litigation and conflicting court decisions in the future. This Article
provides a foundation for this discussion and offers one concrete
example of how Twombly and Iqbal would apply to the affirmative
defense. Iqbal signals that the plausibility standard is here to
stay—the debate has now moved to how broadly that standard
should apply.
247. See supra Part II.
